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I. INTRODUCTION 
In May 2000, the United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
Morrison struck down § 13981 of the Violence Against Women Act 
(VAWA), a provision that allowed victims of gender-based violence (GBV) 
to sue their perpetrators civilly in federal court.1 Section 13981 was enacted 
pursuant to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution, as 
well as under Section 8, Clause 3 of Article I of the Constitution (the 
“Commerce Clause”).2 Although the Morrison Court struck down the 
provision under both constitutional directives, this note will concern itself 
exclusively with the Commerce Clause challenge to § 13981. 
The Commerce Clause allows Congress “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations, and among the several States.”3 Federal legislators rely on 
this language to justify regulating interstate and intrastate activity provided 
the activity affects, in some way, interstate commerce.4 Congress enacted 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Candidate for J.D., May 2016, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. 
1 529 U.S. 598, 601–02, 617 (2000). 
2 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). 
3 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
4
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§ 13981 asserting that the effects of GBV—a state “activity” generally tried 
through state courts—have an effect on interstate commerce.5 Through 
voluminous pre-VAWA hearings and findings, Congress concluded 
violence against women had a profound impact on the nation’s economy.6 
There is a long and complex history behind Congressional regulation 
of state activity via the Commerce Clause and the Supreme Court’s 
subsequent adjudication of it. But the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence has created an unintended incoherency among its holdings 
such that they cannot be applied today in any serviceable way. The Court’s 
endeavor to find a sound, predictable application that will produce 
consistent Commerce Clause rulings has proved elusive, creating untenable, 
formalistic standards that have been manipulated by courts and legislators 
alike in determining which activities can be federally regulated. This 
unruliness opens the door for redrafting Violence Against Women 
legislation to restore the right of certain victims of GBV to sue their 
perpetrators civilly in federal court. Part II of this note will give a broad 
overview of the VAWA, its origin and goals. Part III will provide a 
synopsis of United States v. Morrison and historicize other landmark 
Supreme Court Commerce Clause cases. Part IV discusses the 
inconsistencies of this jurisprudence and the resulting difficulties in trying 
to apply its precedent. Part V examines the opportunities that have emerged 
from this discord to restore the federal civil remedy provision of the 
VAWA for certain victims of GBV. 
II. OVERVIEW OF THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT—ITS 
ORIGIN AND GOALS 
Violence against women is defined as “any act of gender‐based 
violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or 
                                                                                                                           
 
5 See Terrorism in the Home: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Children, Family, Drugs and 
Alcoholism, Domestic Violence of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 101st Cong. (1990); Women 
and Violence: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990); Violence Against 
Women: Victims of the System: Hearing before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1991); 
Violence Against Women: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (1992); Crimes of Violence Motivated by Gender: Hearing before 
the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1993). 
6 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614–15 (2000). 
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psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, 
coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or 
in private life.”7 Congress enacted the VAWA—named so because the 
majority of victims of domestic violence are women and children8—to 
address violent crime in the United States.9 The Act, which applies to all 
victims of domestic violence irrespective of their gender,10 provides, among 
other things, funding for state and local law enforcement entities to enhance 
investigative and prosecutorial services to demographically diverse victims 
of domestic violence, sexual assault, dating violence and stalking.11 At the 
time of the VAWA’s enactment, these services were considered grossly 
inadequate at the state and local levels.12 The Act has been reauthorized 
three times since its initial passage, mostly intact and with some 
expansions.13 
The provision of the VAWA struck down in Morrison, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13981, stated: 
it is the purpose of . . . [§ 13981] to protect the civil rights of victims of gender 
motivated violence and to promote public safety, health, and activities affecting 
interstate commerce by establishing a Federal civil rights cause of action for 
victims of crimes of violence motivated by gender.14 
A successful plaintiff suing under § 13981 could be awarded compensatory 
and punitive damages, injunctive and declaratory relief as well as attorneys’ 
fees.15 
Why was it so important for victims of GBV to have this federal civil 
recourse when they already had criminal and civil recourse in the state 
courts? Among the many reasons espoused in briefs of and for the 
petitioner in Morrison, was that § 13981 conveys the message that GBV 
                                                                                                                           
 
7 G.A. Res. 48/104, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Feb. 23, 1994). 
8 National Task Force to End Sexual and Domestic Violence Against Women, Frequently Asked 
Questions about VAWA and Gender, at 1, available at http://www.ncdsv.org/images/FAQ_ 
VAWA%20and%20Gender.pdf. 
9 42 U.S.C. § 13981. 
10 National Task Force to End Sexual and Domestic Violence Against Women, supra note 8, at 1. 
11 LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42499, The Violence Against Women Act: 
Overview, Legislation, and Federal Funding (2015). 
12 S. REP. NO. 102-197, at 43–47 (1991). 
13 SACCO, supra note 11, at 9–10. 
14 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). 
15 Id. 
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will not be tolerated and is serious enough to warrant federal attention.16 
The intent of the civil rights remedy was to “help shift public perception of 
domestic and sexual violence from a private matter to a civil rights issue.”17 
More importantly, advocates argued, § 13981 was necessary as Congress 
found compelling evidence that existing state efforts were inadequate in 
providing meaningful relief for victims of GBV.18 Congress concluded that 
bias in state justice systems, such as discriminatory stereotyping of victims 
of GBV, often resulted in insufficient investigation and prosecution of these 
crimes and unacceptably lenient punishment for those perpetrators actually 
convicted.19 Many advocates against GBV allege the criminal system is 
completely incapable of deterring and punishing GBV and insist victims 
need the weapon of a civil suit.20 
It is easier for a victim of GBV to prevail in a civil proceeding as 
opposed to a criminal one.21 The fact finder in a civil proceeding uses a 
                                                                                                                           
 
16 See Brief of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 14, 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29); see Brief of Law Professors as 
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 
99-29); see Brief of Petitioner Christy Brzonkala at 17, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
(Nos. 99-5, 99-29); see Brief for the United States at 10, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
(Nos. 99-5, 99-29); see Brief of the States of Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners’ 
Brief on the Merits, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29). 
17 Irin Carmon, How the Supreme Court Turned its Back on Domestic Violence, MSNBC 
(Sept. 17, 2014, 5:54 PM), http://www.msnbc.com/msnbc/how-the-supreme-court-turned-its-back-
domestic-violence (quoting Julie Goldscheid, an attorney who defended the constitutionality of the civil 
rights remedy of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act in courts nationwide and before the U.S. 
Supreme Court in United States v. Morrison). 
18 See H.R. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385–86 (1994); S. REP. NO. 103-138, at 38, 41–55 (1993); S. 
REP. NO. 102-197, at 33–35, 41, 43–47 (1991). 
19 See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 103-711, at 385–86 (1994); see Krista M. Anderson, Twelve Years 
Post Morrison: State Civil Remedies and a Proposed Government Subsidy to Incentivize Claims By 
Rape Survivors, 36 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 223, 225 (2013); see Michelle J. Anderson, Women Do Not 
Report the Violence They Suffer: Violence Against Women and the State Action Doctrine, 46 VILL. L. 
REV. 907, 924–39 (2001); see Sally F. Goldfarb, The Supreme Court, the Violence Against Women Act, 
and the Use and Abuse of Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 57, 74, 140–42 (2002). 
20 See Brief of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 20–30, 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29); see Brief of Law Professors as Amici Curiae in 
Support of Petitioners at 18–25. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29); see Brief of 
Petitioner Christy Brzonkala at 29–31, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29); see Brief for 
the United States at 36–42, Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29); see Brief of the States of 
Arizona et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits at 15–20, Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29). 
21 Tom Lininger, Is It Wrong to Sue for Rape?, 57 DUKE L.J. 1557, 1574–75 (2008). 
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lower burden of proof to determine liability.22 Instead of determining 
whether a defendant is guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt,” as is done in a 
criminal proceeding, a plaintiff in a civil suit need only prove the 
allegations by “a preponderance of the evidence.”23 Victims cannot send 
their perpetrators to prison by suing them, but the damages they can be 
awarded are another type of punishment that can help replace a victim’s lost 
income and pay for counseling.24 
After Morrison, a few states responded by passing their own versions 
of § 13981.25 However, in most states, victims of GBV have yet to recover 
the legal advantages lost when § 13981 was struck down.26 Most state 
remedies have short statute of limitations, do not address all forms of GBV 
and do not award attorneys’ fees.27 The VAWA’s civil remedy made it 
easier for victims to find attorneys to take their cases because it encouraged 
courts to award attorneys’ fees to successful plaintiffs.28 
Vice President Joe Biden recently voiced his desire to restore § 13981 
and wants to “convene a summit to figure out how to get [the civil remedy] 
back in.”29 He wants victims “to be able to go into court and take away the 
car, the job, the money, whatever it was . . . because their civil rights had 
been violated.”30 Julie Goldscheid, an attorney who argued on behalf of the 
petitioner in Morrison, says restoring the federal civil remedy for certain 
victims of GBV is a possibility: 
From a constitutional perspective, there’s at least one way to do it . . . Congress 
could allow such suits where there’s a connection to interstate commerce, 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 Id. at 1575. 
23 Id. at 1574. 
24 Id. 
25 Hannah Brenner, Transcending the Criminal Law’s “One Size Fits All” Response to Domestic 
Violence, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 301, 322 (2013); Julie Goldscheid, The Civil Rights Remedy 
of the 1994 Violence Against Women Act: Struck Down but Not Ruled Out, 39 FAM. L.Q. 157, 165–66 
(2005). 
26 See Anderson, supra note 19, at 239–41, 249, 251, 266–68. 
27 Alexandra Brodsky, All Survivors, Not Just Students, Need Civil Law Options, FEMINISTING 
(Feb. 1, 2015), http://feministing.com/2015/01/02/all-survivors-not-just-students-need-civil-law-
options/. 
28 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND ABUSE 527 (Laura L. Finley ed., 2013). 
29 Gregory Korte, Biden Wants Victims of Sexual Assault to be Able to Sue, USA TODAY (Sept. 9, 
2014, 7:25 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2014/09/09/biden-ray-rice-domestic-
violence/15333095/. 
30 Id. 
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broadly defined: If someone lost their job, had to drop out of school, had to flee 
out of state, or lived in one state and the abuse happened in another.31 
III. UNITED STATES V. MORRISON AND ITS PLACE IN COMMERCE CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Christy Brzonkala, the petitioner in Morrison, used § 13981 to sue her 
alleged rapists in federal court for violating her civil rights.32 The 
respondents moved to dismiss the suit, in part, on grounds it was 
unconstitutional for Congress to enact § 13981 as it exceeded Congress’ 
commerce powers.33 The United States joined Brzonkala in defending 
§ 13981’s constitutionality.34 They argued that, through the Court’s use of 
the “rational basis test,”35 § 13981 could be classified as a regulation of 
intrastate activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate 
commerce.36 
The Court held that Congress exceeded its commerce power in 
enacting § 13981.37 It stated that crimes of GBV are not, in and of 
themselves, economic activity and therefore too far removed from their 
effect on interstate commerce.38 The Court hypothesized the petitioner’s 
reasoning would allow Congress to regulate any state activity that, in the 
aggregate, had a substantial effect on the nation’s economy.39 
To understand how Congress can rewrite legislation capable of 
restoring the VAWA’s civil remedy for certain victims of GBV, we must 
track the evolution of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence. For much of the nineteenth century, Congress’ commerce 
                                                                                                                           
 
31 Id. 
32 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 601–04 (2000). 
33 Id. at 604. 
34 Id. 
35 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1279 (2014) (“Where a classification does not involve suspect 
criteria or fundamental rights, it is examined under the relatively relaxed rational basis standard which 
requires only that the classification rationally or reasonably further a legitimate governmental 
purpose.”). 
36 Brief of Petitioner Christy Brzonkala at 26–29, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
(Nos. 99-5, 99-29); Brief for the United States at 15–28, United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) 
(Nos. 99-5, 99-29). 
37 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627. 
38 Id. at 613. 
39 Id. at 612–13. 
2015] UNITED STATES v. MORRISON 15 YEARS LATER 167 
 
Vol. 34, No. 1 (2015) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2015.94 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
power was sidelined primarily because proponents of the “interstate” slave 
trade feared Congress would use the power to regulate or perhaps ban 
slavery.40 After the Civil War, the United States became increasingly 
industrialized, national economic problems emerged, and Congress began 
to regulate interstate commerce more deeply.41 As Congress’ regulation of 
state activity became more contested, the courts reacted by developing a 
framework for determining when Congress could regulate an intrastate 
activity.42 Two broad formulas were created: (1) if the intrastate activity 
had a direct effect on interstate commerce, Congress could regulate it. 
However, if the effect was only indirect, Congress could not regulate it; and 
(2) Congress could regulate commerce but not production or 
manufacturing.43 
This was the status quo until the Great Depression.44 President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s efforts to overcome the Depression involved 
passing federal legislation to regulate the nation’s economy.45 Congress, as 
part of the New Deal and under its Commerce Clause authority, passed a 
series of statutes designed to regulate the ailing economy.46 Businesses 
affected by the new laws turned to the courts, contesting Congress’ power 
to regulate their operations.47 
In the mid-1930s, two Supreme Court cases, Schechter Poultry 
Corporation v. United States and Carter v. Carter Coal Company, 
challenged federal legislation requiring their businesses to comply with 
various fair labor and competition codes. In Schechter, the Court held that 
the petitioner’s slaughtering of chickens, bought locally and sold locally, 
did not have a direct enough effect on interstate commerce to be regulated 
in this way.48 The Carter case involved the production of coal.49 The Court 
                                                                                                                           
 
40 See DAVID L. LIGHTNER, SLAVERY AND THE COMMERCE POWER: HOW THE STRUGGLE 
AGAINST THE INTERSTATE SLAVE TRADE LED TO THE CIVIL WAR 65–88 (2006). 
41 JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, 
AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789–2002, at 87 (2003). 
42 See JEFFREY M. SHAMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: ILLUSION AND REALITY 5–6 
(2001). 
43 See VILE, supra note 41, at 88. 
44 See id. 
45 See id. 
46 See id. 
47 See VILE, supra note 41, at 117. 
48 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546–51 (1935). 
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again reined in Congress’ commerce power by using the direct versus 
indirect effect analysis, which determined that mining for coal is not 
commerce, but instead production, and that its relationship with interstate 
commerce was too indirect.50 
As the Depression and its accompanying labor strife continued, the 
Roosevelt Administration enacted, via its commerce powers, the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which allowed workers to unionize.51 One of 
the nation’s largest steel companies, Jones & Laughlin (J & L), challenged 
the NLRA in 1937.52 The Court affirmed the statute, essentially discarding 
the “direct vs. indirect” and “commerce vs. production” tests.53 Instead the 
Court’s rational-basis analysis focused on the reality of the nation’s 
economic despair and the desperate need to fix it by stating that “[a]lthough 
activities may be intrastate in character when separately considered, if they 
have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their 
control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens 
and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that 
control.”54 
In 1941, the Supreme Court further departed from its pre-1937 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence when it upheld, in United States v. Darby, 
the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.55 The Court held unanimously that 
Congress’ commerce power permitted federal regulation of employment 
conditions.56 Darby overturned Hammer v. Dagenhart, which held federal 
regulation of intrastate child labor for the manufacture of products that may 
never reach the stream of interstate commerce, was beyond Congress’ 
commerce powers.57 
Wickard v. Filburn, a 1942 Supreme Court case, stemmed from a 
challenge to a provision of the 1938 Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) 
that limited farmers from growing more than an allotted quota of wheat in 
                                                                                                                           
 
49 See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
50 See id. at 309–11. 
51 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 22–24 (1937). 
52 See id. 
53 See id. 
54 Id. at 37. 
55 See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
56 See id. 
57 Id. at 115–17. 
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an effort to stabilize the nation’s wheat market.58 Filburn, an Ohio farmer, 
contested the quota because any amount of wheat he grew above his quota 
was strictly for personal consumption and was therefore a wholly intrastate, 
non-commercial activity.59 The Court held the production quotas 
constitutional as applied to wheat grown for personal consumption, 
extending federal regulation to production of commodities not intended for 
intrastate or interstate commerce.60 As it did in J & L, the Wickard Court 
rejected the use of constitutional formulas in favor of a rational-basis 
analysis to resolve a national crisis.61 Filburn’s surplus wheat alone was 
insignificant.62 However, if all wheat farmers grew a surplus it would lower 
the demand and price of wheat.63 These farmers would not have to go to the 
market to buy wheat for their own consumption.64 The Court, by not 
focusing on the individual (Filburn) but rather on the class of individuals 
represented (wheat farmers), held that if the aggregate result of the 
intrastate activity “exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate 
commerce,” Congress can regulate it via its commerce powers.65 
In the 1960s, Congress enacted landmark civil rights legislation 
prohibiting private businesses from discriminating against individuals on 
the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin.66 However, these laws 
were not enacted under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.67 Instead, they were enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause 
because the Fourteenth Amendment had been construed to only apply to 
state governmental action and not to private action.68 Therefore, Congress 
was reluctant to pass civil-rights legislation under the Fourteenth 
Amendment in fear it would be struck down.69 This legislation was 
                                                                                                                           
 
58 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
59 See id. 
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 Id. at 127–28. 
63 See id. 
64 See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942). 
65 Id. at 125. 
66 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2012). 
67 OTIS STEPHENS, JR. & JOHN SCHEB, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, VOLUME II: CIVIL 
RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 457 (6th ed. 2015). 
68 Id. 
69 See id. 
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ultimately put in front of the Supreme Court, which said blacks traveling 
through the country are hindered if they cannot stay in a hotel.70 And if 
hotels will not serve them it affects interstate commerce, namely, the travel 
of blacks throughout the country.71 In the same vein, the legislation 
regulated restaurants that served interstate travelers but further justified this 
by arguing that any restaurant that sells product procured through interstate 
commerce is also required to serve blacks.72 Although Congress had no 
empirical evidence that requiring the service industry to serve blacks would 
benefit interstate commerce, the Court concluded that Congress only 
needed a rational basis for determining that regulating this issue would 
benefit interstate commerce.73 
For over half a century, the Supreme Court did not strike down a 
congressional enactment as violative of Congress’ Commerce Clause 
power.74 Much of what Congress has done since the 1930s was a result of 
the expansion of Congress’ commerce powers.75 
United States v. Lopez was the first Supreme Court case since the New 
Deal to set limits on Congress’ commerce powers.76 The case involved the 
Gun-Free School Zones Act (“GFSZA”), which made it a federal crime to 
bring a gun into or near a school.77 Up until Lopez, the Court had been 
using the rational basis test to determine whether a state activity 
substantially affected interstate commerce.78 Did Congress have a rational 
basis for concluding that guns at school affect the learning environment, 
perhaps to the extent that many students will not go to school?79 And if 
students do not go to school that they will grow into less productive adults, 
which in turn affects the economy and hence interstate commerce?80 This 
                                                                                                                           
 
70 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 253 (1964). 
71 See id. 
72 See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964). 
73 Id. at 303–05. 
74 Mark C. Christie, Economic Regulation in the United States: The Constitutional Framework, 
40 U. RICH. L. REV. 949, 975 (2006). 
75 See id. 
76 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995). 
77 See id. 
78 Id. at 557. 
79 See id. at 564. 
80 See id. 
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train of thought is arguably rational.81 The Court’s reasoning, however, 
diverged: “We pause to consider the implications of the Government’s 
arguments. The Government admits under its ‘costs of crime’ reasoning, 
that Congress could regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that 
might lead to violent crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to 
interstate commerce.”82 The Court argued this would encroach on the police 
power of the individual states.83 
The Lopez Court held that, unlike the farming of wheat or the 
operation of a hotel, bringing a gun to school is not an economic activity.84 
So, a new test emerged: If the activity is economic in nature, use the 
rational basis test and aggregate the results.85 If the results show a 
substantial effect on interstate commerce, Congress can regulate the 
activity.86 However, if the activity is noneconomic in nature, a presumption 
exists against federal regulation.87 To overcome the presumption, Congress 
must show a “jurisdictional element”88 between the state activity and 
interstate commerce.89 
Jump to United States v. Morrison (2000)—is rape an economic or 
noneconomic activity?90 In the years before the VAWA’s enactment, 
Congress, through voluminous hearings and findings, concluded that 
violence against women has a serious impact on the nation’s economy; 
many women lose many days of productive work; they do not want to 
travel or live in certain areas; it causes millions of dollars of economic 
damage throughout the nation.91 Does this make rape economic in nature? 
                                                                                                                           
 
81 See id. 
82 Id. at 564. 
83 See id. at 567. 
84 Id. at 559–60. 
85 See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
86 See id. at 562–67. 
87 See id. 
88 See id. at 561–62 (defining the “jurisdictional element” in Lopez as something that ensures, 
“through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate commerce”). 
89 See id. 
90 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
91 See Domestic Violence: Terrorism in the Home: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Children, 
Family, Drugs and Alcoholism of the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Resources, 101st Cong. 101-897 
(1990); Women and Violence: Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 101-939 
(1990); Violence Against Women: Victims of the System: Hearings on S. 15 Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 102d Cong. 102-369 (1991); Violence Against Women: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
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The Supreme Court said no and utilized the same question posed in Lopez: 
Is the activity at issue, by its very nature, economic or noneconomic?92 
Based on this question, the Court held that raping someone is not an 
economic activity.93 The Court also asserted that § 13981 contained no 
jurisdictional element.94 
The next notable case in this line of Supreme Court Commerce Clause 
jurisprudence is Gonzales v. Raich (2005).95 Although California approved 
the use of medicinal marijuana for persons whose physician prescribes it as 
a means of reducing suffering from illness, federal government officials 
confiscated the marijuana plants from one such patient’s home.96 The plants 
were illegal Schedule I drugs under the federal Controlled Substances Act 
(CSA)—federal legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause.97 The 
CSA, a provision of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and 
Control Act of 1970 (CDAPCA), does not recognize the medical use of 
marijuana.98 Two California patients who relied on their physician-
prescribed marijuana challenged the CSA arguing that the Act, as applied to 
their conduct, was an unconstitutional exercise of Congress’ Commerce 
Clause power.99 The Supreme Court reasoned otherwise, holding that 
Congress may criminalize the production and use of homegrown marijuana 
even where states approve its use for medicinal purposes.100 Using the 
Lopez/Morrison test (Is the activity, by its very nature, economic or 
noneconomic?), the Court recognized that growing medicinal marijuana for 
one’s own consumption is, essentially, a noneconomic activity, which 
would protect the activity from federal regulation.101 However, the key 
finding in Raich is that regulation of noncommercial, intrastate activity is 
                                                                                                                           
 
Crime and Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 1 (1992); Crimes of Violence 
Motivated by Gender: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the H. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 1 (1993). 
92 Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610–13. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 613 (describing a “jurisdictional element” as something that would establish “that the 
federal cause of action is in pursuance of Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce”). 
95 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
96 Id. at 5–7. 
97 Id. at 14, 22. 
98 Id. at 11–14. 
99 Id. at 6–8, 15. 
100 Id. at 27–33. 
101 Id. at 26, 32. 
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constitutionally permissible under the Commerce Clause if the regulation is 
an “essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the 
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were 
regulated.”102 This will be referred to in this note as the Broader Regulatory 
Scheme Doctrine. 
The case on the Affordable Care Act, National Federation of 
Independent Business v. Sebelius, may have complicated things even 
further by adding a new dichotomy to the analysis: “activity vs. 
inactivity.”103 Before analyzing whether an activity is economic or 
noneconomic, we now must first determine if the “activity” is even an 
activity.104 The Supreme Court held that requiring Americans to buy health 
insurance, Americans who were presently choosing not to buy it, was 
regulating inactivity and that Congress, under its commerce power, could 
not regulate inactivity.105 And the Commerce Clause analysis essentially 
stopped there.106 The Court did not engage in an in-depth analysis of 
whether regulating this “inactivity” was essential to a larger, federal 
regulatory scheme, such as the Affordable Care Act’s “insurance 
reforms.”107 
IV. THE CURRENT STATE OF SUPREME COURT COMMERCE CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Where do these cases leave us in regard to Supreme Court Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence? Is there a solid theory or test that coherently ties all 
of these cases together? Justice Rehnquist wrote in his majority opinion in 
Lopez that there are three broad categories of activity that Congress can 
regulate under its commerce powers: “the use of the channels of interstate 
commerce” such as interstate highways, shipping lanes, railroad systems, 
and the mail; “the instrumentalities of interstate commerce or persons or 
things in interstate commerce” such as automobiles, ships, aircraft and 
anything else that travels across state lines; and “those activities that 
                                                                                                                           
 
102 See id. at 24–30. 
103 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 passim (2012). 
104 See id. at 2586–87. 
105 See id. at 2586–91. 
106 See id. at 2592. 
107 See id. at 2591–93. 
174 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 34:161 
 
Vol. 34, No. 1 (2015) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2015.94 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
substantially affect interstate commerce.”108 It is the third category that 
leaves federal Commerce Clause jurisprudence in a state of instability and 
uncertainty. 
There is clearly a struggle to find a test that applies to all Commerce 
Clause legislation—a formalistic categorical approach where the values of 
federalism do not dictate how the lines get drawn between activity that can 
be regulated and activity that cannot. That struggle has led to incoherence 
among the tests in play today. They cannot be applied in a meaningful way 
in a highly interconnected economy. Without a test, however, what are the 
Court’s options? The Court could, on a case-by-case basis, deem one 
activity too attenuated from interstate commerce and another activity “close 
enough.” Then the question becomes, what is too attenuated? The challenge 
in wanting limitations is constructing a workable test that yields those 
limitations. And if the test is simply “is it too attenuated?” who decides—
the legislature or the judiciary? A workable test would prevent the Court 
from acting as legislators—striking down a law because the Court feels the 
connection with interstate commerce is too far-fetched or attenuated. So, 
the Court uses tests. But the tests have proved highly manipulative. In fact, 
Congress rewrote the GFSZA after Lopez, inserting a “jurisdictional 
element” into the law by applying it to firearms that have “moved” through 
interstate commerce.109 And the more important question about using a test 
is, whether it really accomplishes what needs to be done. We need Congress 
to be able to legislate properly when there is a national interest at stake. Not 
having found (and not for lack of trying) a viable test in the nearly two 
centuries of Commerce Clause legislation and adjudication leaves us 
guessing—Do we need a test? And if so, how do we formulate one? 
                                                                                                                           
 
108 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995). 
109 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2012). 
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V. RESTORING § 13981 BY WAY OF RAICH 
Lopez and Morrison had limited the scope of activity Congress could 
regulate via its commerce powers by enforcing the “essential” element of 
the revived Broader Regulatory Scheme Doctrine, confining regulation to 
purely economic activity and retreating from the oft-used rational basis 
test.110 The Raich Court, without overturning Lopez and Morrison, diverged 
from this analysis to allow Congress to regulate homegrown, medicinal 
marijuana in California.111 By utilizing the Broader Regulatory Scheme 
Doctrine in conjunction with the very deferential rational basis test, and by 
downplaying any economic/noneconomic considerations of the activity in 
question, Raich created a new framework from which to redraft legislation 
that would afford federal civil recourse for certain victims of GBV.112 
A. Broader Regulatory Scheme Doctrine 
Raich held that the CSA was “an essential part of a larger regulation of 
economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless 
the intrastate activity were regulated.”113 This decision suggests that 
Congress has unlimited power to regulate intrastate activity as long as it 
does so within an ambitious, far-reaching federal regulation. 
Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Raich vigorously chastised the majority 
for turning the Morrison/Lopez line of cases into a “drafting guide” for 
Commerce Clause legislation.114 Having objected strongly to the use of the 
broader CDAPCA to justify the enforcement of its CSA sub-component, 
she wrote: “Today’s decision allows Congress to regulate intrastate activity 
without check, so long as there is some implication by legislative design 
that regulating intrastate activity is essential . . . to the interstate regulatory 
scheme.”115 
                                                                                                                           
 
110 See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 610–13 (2000); Morrison, 
529 U.S. at 634, 637 (Souter, J., dissenting); Morrison, 529 U.S. at 665 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
111 See Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
112 See id. at 22. 
113 See id. at 26–27 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995)). 
114 See id. at 42–57 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
115 Id. at 46. 
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Of course there are advocates and scholars that insist § 13981 was an 
essential part of a larger, federal regulation—that the VAWA was as 
comprehensive in its approach to fighting GBV as the CSA was with 
respect to drugs.116 Certain precedent, to some extent, supports this. The 
Second Circuit described the VAWA as “a comprehensive statute designed 
to provide women nationwide greater protection and recourse against 
violence and to impose accountability on abusers.”117 The Fourth Circuit, in 
the decision that preceded Morrison, referred to the VAWA as a 
“comprehensive federal statute designed to address ‘the escalating problem 
of violent crime against women.’”118 Justice Breyer offers further, yet 
indirect support, for considering § 13981 an essential component of the 
VAWA by exposing the ill-defined nature of regulatory schemes. In 
Morrison he argued that the determination of whether or not a provision is a 
component of a larger regulation risks being arbitrary, proposing that 
Congress can “save [§ 13981] by including it, or much of it, in a broader 
‘Safe Transport’ or ‘Workplace Safety’ act.”119 Arguably then, the statute 
struck down in Lopez could have been linked to Congress’ regulation of 
firearms as well as to federal resources earmarked for education. Similarly, 
§ 13981 could have been linked to a comprehensive effort to protect women 
from discrimination in education and employment. 
The holding of United States v. Maxwell (2006) is illustrative of how 
Raich’s Broader Regulatory Scheme Doctrine has changed the landscape of 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence.120 In Maxwell, the Eleventh Circuit, in a 
remand from the Supreme Court in light of Raich, held that application of 
the federal Child Pornography Prevention Act provisions criminalizing the 
                                                                                                                           
 
116 Chip Venie, Federalism and Federalist Analysis of Raich Decision, Medical Marijuana is 
Dead?, JUSTICE FOR ALL BLOG (June 25, 2005, 11:12 AM), http://crimelaw.blogspot.com/2005/06/ 
federalism-and-federalist-analysis-of.html; see Scott Lemieux, Gonzalez v. Raich, LAWYERS, GUNS & 
MONEY BLOG (June 8, 2005), http://www.lawyersgunsmoneyblog.com/2005/06/gonzales-v-raich; Brief 
of Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3, United States v. 
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (Nos. 99-5, 99-29), 1999 WL 1072538.; Sara E. Kropf, The Failure of 
United States v. Lopez: Analyzing the Violence Against Women Act, 8 S. CAL. REV. L & WOMEN’S 
STUD. 373, 389–90 (1999). 
117 United States v. Casciano, 124 F.3d 106, 110 (2d Cir. 1997). 
118 Brzonkala v. Va. Polytechnic Inst. & State Univ., 132 F.3d 949, 962–63 (4th Cir. 1997), 
vacated en banc, 169 F.3d 820 (4th Cir. 1999) (quoting S. REP. NO. 10-138 at 37 (1993)). 
119 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 656–57 (2000) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
120 United States v. Maxwell, 446 F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2006). 
2015] UNITED STATES v. MORRISON 15 YEARS LATER 177 
 
Vol. 34, No. 1 (2015) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2015.94 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
production and possession of child pornography to the intrastate possession 
of child pornography did not violate the Commerce Clause.121 The court 
determined that the lack of a jurisdictional element could be disregarded if 
an activity fell under Raich.122 No longer needing a jurisdictional element, 
the broader regulatory scheme framework from Raich appears to be the 
dominating litmus test for Commerce Clause adjudication. 
A promising use of the Raich theory for restoring federal civil recourse 
to certain victims of GBV is to connect a civil remedy (a “mini § 13981”) 
to a federal regulation of violence connected with the workplace, travel, 
public accommodations or a place of business. For example, the recognition 
of sexual assault as prohibited sexual harassment under federal employment 
law provides an opportunity to link a mini § 13981, using Raich as a 
“drafting guide,” to federal laws prohibiting job discrimination such as Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act, Americans with Disabilities Act or Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act. These laws prohibit the discriminatory 
practice of “harassment on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, national 
origin, disability, genetic information, or age.”123 A civil remedy in this 
context would certainly reach some victims of GBV. Over seventy-two 
million women work outside the home in the United States, comprising 
almost half of workers in all occupations.124 Statistics from 2014 reveal that 
GBV in the workplace mostly affects women: “Worldwide, 35 percent of 
women experience direct violence, and 40 to 50 percent experience 
workplace sexual harassment.”125 
Whether the harassment/assault is perpetrated by a supervisor and 
brought under a Title VII hostile work environment claim (employers are 
subject to vicarious liability for unlawful harassment by supervisors) or by 
a co-worker, customer or client, in which case the employer is sued under a 
negligence theory, an employer is liable for harassment of its employees if 
                                                                                                                           
 
121 See id. at 1219. 
122 See id. at 1218–19. 
123 U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Federal Laws Prohibiting Job Discrimination 
Questions and Answers, http://www.eeoc.gov/facts/qanda.html (last updated Nov. 21, 2009). 
124 U.S. Equal Emp’t Opportunity Comm’n, Preventing and Addressing Workplace Harassment, 
www1.eeoc.gov/eeoc/meetings/1-14-15/graves.cfm?renderforprint=1 (last visited Sept. 25, 2015). 
125 Press Release, Comm. on Educ. & the Workforce, House Dems Urge U.S. Businesses to 
Combat Gender-Based Violence in the Workplace (Oct. 23, 2014), http://democrats.edworkforce.house 
.gov/press-release/house-dems-urge-us-businesses-combat-gender-based-violence-workplace. 
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the employer was negligent in addressing the harassment.126 What is 
problematic, however, on both the state and federal level, is that a great 
many of these lawsuits sue third-party defendants—employers with “deep 
pockets.”127 For example, a plaintiff may bring a negligence claim against a 
nursing facility that does not screen new hires for a criminal background or 
a shopping mall patrolled by callous security guards.128 Without these “deep 
pockets” to pay for a plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees, lawyers frequently turn 
down these types of cases even if the plaintiff is likely to prevail.129 
But Raich has given Congress the tools necessary to make a 
perpetrator of GBV personally responsible to the victim. Congress can 
simply attach a provision for civil redress to broader federal legislation 
regulating employment law or attach it to a new regulatory scheme. 
Because an activity no longer has to be an “economic” activity for Congress 
to regulate it under its commerce powers, Congress need only have a 
rational basis for why regulation of intrastate GBV is “essential” to a 
broader regulatory scheme. 
Section 2261 of the Federal Crimes Code also could potentially 
accommodate a mini § 13981. Section 2261 prohibits: 
a person who travels in interstate or foreign commerce . . . with the intent to kill, 
injure, harass, or intimidate a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner, and 
who, in the course of or as a result of such travel or presence, [to] commit[] or 
attempt[] to commit a crime of violence against that spouse, intimate partner, or 
dating partner.130 
Section 2261 also prohibits a person from causing a spouse or intimate or 
dating partner “to travel in interstate or foreign commerce . . . by force, 
coercion, duress, or fraud, and who, in the course of, as a result of, or to 
facilitate such conduct or travel, commits or attempts to commit a crime of 
violence against that spouse [or partner].”131 Without much imagination, 
§ 2261 could include a rape committed by someone who traveled in 
                                                                                                                           
 
126 Vance v. Ball State Univ., 133 S. Ct. 2434, 2439 (2013). 
127 See Ellen M. Bublick, Tort Suits Filed by Rape and Sexual Assault Victims in Civil Courts: 
Lessons for Courts, Classrooms and Constituencies, 59 SMU L. REV. 55, 57, 96–97 (2006). 
128 See, e.g., L.A.C. ex rel. D.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., L.P. 75 S.W.3d 247 (Mo. 
2002); Kladstrup v. Westfall Health Care Ctr., Inc., 701 N.Y.S.2d 808 (Sup. Ct. 1999). 
129 See Bublick, supra note 127, at 77. 
130 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(1) (2015). 
131 18 U.S.C. § 2261(a)(2) (2015). 
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interstate commerce for that purpose, if the rape intimidated or injured the 
victim “in the course of” or “as a result of” the travel. 
Also, attaching a federal civil remedy to Title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972, which prohibits sexual harassment in public 
education programs and activities that receive federal financial assistance 
conceivably could pass precedential muster under Raich.132 A mini § 13981 
here would be especially helpful for someone if, despite an educational 
institution being in full compliance with Title IX, he or she becomes a 
victim of on-campus GBV. The victim can hold the perpetrator personally 
responsible through a federal civil private right of action. 
B. Economic Nature of the Intrastate Activity 
Like the dissenters in Raich, many scholars argue that the Raich Court 
broadened the definition of “economic” to the extent that Commerce Clause 
legislation can reach virtually all intrastate activity.133 If true, VAWA 
advocates do not have to worry about whether GBV is considered an 
economic or noneconomic activity since regulating a noneconomic, 
intrastate activity via the Broader Regulatory Scheme Doctrine shields that 
activity from an economic versus noneconomic activity analysis. 
C. Rational Basis Analysis 
The Raich Court, according a high level of deference to Congress, held 
that regulation of the intrastate activity at issue was “essential” to a broader 
regulatory scheme.134 How does the Court determine whether the regulated 
activity in a given case is an essential part of a larger regulation? The 
holding in Raich suggests that the Court simply read Congress’ findings. 
The Raich Court examined the findings associated with enactment of the 
CSA, findings asserting that the regulation of intrastate marijuana 
                                                                                                                           
 
132 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1)–(9) (1972). 
133 See, e.g., Gary R. Rom, RLUIPA and Prisoner’s Rights: Vindicating Liberty of Conscience for 
the Condemned by Targeting a State’s Bottom Line, 44 VAL. U. L. REV. 283, 319 (2009); Ilya Somin, 
Gonzales v. Raich and the Individual Mandate, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 29, 2015, 2:31 PM), 
volokh.com/2010/10/05/Gonzales-v-raich-and-the-individual-mandate/. 
134 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24–30 (2005). 
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possession was “essential” to regulating interstate marijuana possession.135 
In short, the Court took Congress’ word for it. This opens the possibility 
that the government is not required to actually prove that a mini § 13981 
regulates “economic activity” or that it is an “essential” part of a broader 
regulation. Rather, the government can win by showing that Congress 
might have had some “rational” reason for believing that one of these two 
conclusions is correct. 
In statutes preceding Raich, Congress may have drafted poorly by 
regulating a purely intrastate, noneconomic activity. However, these older 
statutes could be saved since it is of no consequence whether Congress 
enacts a certain provision separately rather than being enacted as part of a 
larger regulatory scheme. Certainly Congress can incrementally add 
legislation addressing a particular intrastate noneconomic activity to an 
existing regulatory scheme. Congress simply must show it had a rational 
basis for deeming the additional legislation “essential” to that regulatory 
scheme. The holding in Raich is essentially a rule that affords Congress the 
ability to enact regulations that would be unconstitutional if isolated by 
incorporating them into a larger regulatory scheme. Perhaps, depending on 
how creative Congress can be while using Raich’s “drafting guide,” other 
possibilities will be revealed that will give to as many GBV victims as 
possible the very meaningful choice of civilly suing their perpetrator in the 
federal court system. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Raich and other notable Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence, along with the Court finding it unnecessary to 
overturn seemingly conflicting precedent, has created new doctrine that 
appears to allow for the redrafting of laws like § 13981 for satisfying the 
commerce argument. Fifteen years post Morrison, as Commerce Clause 
precedent has developed, and as we might suspect from the history of 
Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it is not at all a stable body of doctrine. 
As it stands, there are means to exploit this instability by carving § 13981 
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into different settings that can be tied to some broader economic regulation 
and making a case for it working under the Commerce Clause. 
